Strict Liability under Tort

Strict liability, sometimes called absolute liability, is the legal responsibility for damages, or injury, even if the person found strictly liable was not at fault or negligent. Strict liability means that although the defendant might have taken all reasonable precautions to avoid or minimize risks arising from his activity, he may still be found liable if the tort which has arisen falls under the category of strict liability torts. Unlike the defendant in a cause of action for intentional torts, the mental state of a defendant in a strict liability action is irrelevant. It is not a requirement that the defendant must intend to do an act which is alleged to give rise to the tort of strict liability.

Strict liability can also arise in a cause of action for breach of statutory duty but the strictness of liability would very much depend on the wording of the relevant statutory provisions. Strict liability often applies to those engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous ventures. A classic example of strict liability is the owner of a tiger rehabilitation center. No matter how strong the tiger cages are, if an animal escapes and causes damage and injury, the owner is held liable. Another example is a contractor hiring a demolition subcontractor that lacks proper insurance. If the subcontractor makes a mistake, the contractor is strictly liable for any damage that occurs.

Actually, there are many categories of strict liability such as animal liability, product liability which was stated in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products , and liability of a bank for making payment on forged instruments of its customer such as in the case of United Asia Bank v. Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd . However, I would only discuss this branch of tort law according to the landmark case of Ryland v. Fletcher

In this case, the defendants employed independent contractors to build a dam on land they occupied. Unbeknown-st to them, the dam was constructed over five unused mine shafts, which led into the underground working of an old mine. There was a connection between these workings and the workings of the plaintiff’s mines. When the reservoir was filled the water burst into the shafts and flowed into the plaintiff’s mines, and the plaintiff sought to recover damages.

Blackburn J in the Court of Exchequer Chamber said:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default: or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.

The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining his own property.

But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, of filth, or stenches.”

This case went on appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber was upheld. Lord Cairns in the House of Lords further added that the rule only applied where the defendant had used his land for a non-natural use.

Basically, the law imputes strict liability to situations it considers to be inherently dangerous. It discourages reckless behavior and needless loss by forcing potential defendants to take every possible precaution. It also has the effect of simplifying litigation and allowing the victim to become whole more quickly. However, liability in the tort of strict liability is not absolute as there are defences. Besides, the defendant is only liable for the foreseeable consequences of the escape of a dangerous thing in the course of a non-natural use of the land.

There are four elements required to establish strict liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher rule which are dangerous objects, intentional of storage, escape and non-natural use of the land.

2.1 DANGEROUS OBJECTS

The object or thing must be dangerous and the rule applies to anything that may cause damage if it escapes. The object or thing therefore, need not be dangerous per se because there are objects which are safe if a dangerous object and this element is fulfilled. This principle has been successfully applied to gas, noxious fumes explosives, fire, electricity, water, sewage and slag heaps. Whether the object is considered dangerous in that it may cause damage if it escape is determined through the ordinary experience of mankind.

In Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor the plaintiff rented a shop house and lived on the first floor of the building of repairing and distributing tyres. The defendant also stored petrol for the purpose of his business. One morning the defendant’s premise caught fire. The fire spread to the first floor and the plaintiff’s wife and child died in that tragedy. The court held the defendant liable under the rule in Rylands v Flecther as the petrol was a dangerous object.

2.2 BRINGING AND ACCUMULATION OF THINGS ON THE LAND

The rule only applies to an object or thing which the defendant purposely keeps and collects. In other word the defendant will only be liable if he has accumulated the object. It is applicable to anything that is naturally on the land. It follows that when something that is naturally on the land escapes and cause damage, the occupier will not be liable unless he intentionally allows the escape to occur or that the escape is foreseeable and yet the defendant does nothing to prevent the probable escape.

In Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co Ltd the defendant used some explosives to break some rock on his land. Some of the rocks fell below the land and injured the plaintiff. The rocks were not purposely collected or kept on the land but the explosives were purposely collected and kept. Yet the defendant was held liable for escape of the rocks because the way in which the injury was sustained was through rock blasting, which was not a natural use of land.

2.3 THE THINGS MUST HAVE ESCAPED

The rule is applicable only when there is an escape. Escape means the object has escaped from a place where the defendant has control and authority to a place where the defendant has no control and authority to a place where the defendant has no control and authority.

In Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Manchester the defendants were held liable when an explosion on their property caused inflammable gas escape into the plaintiff’s house and consequently set fire to the plaintiff’s property. The meaning of escape has been extended to include a situation where the use of the dangerous object causes or create an event from which damage is sustained.

2.4 NON-NATURAL USE OF LAND

An ordinary or natural use of land would include erecting a house, installing water, electric wiring and gas pipes. It also include doing something ordinary and natural, through artificial, such as constructing a fish pond. The meaning of non-natural use of land was explained in the cases of Rickards v Lothian where the Lord Moulton stated: “It must be some special bringing with it increased danger to other and must not merely be the ordinary of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.”


Lord Porter in the case of Read v Lyons & Co Ltd said that all factors such as time, location and the ordinary activities of mankind must be taken into consideration, so what is dangerous or constitutes a non-natural use of land may differ in different circumstance. In Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board the defendant planted a yew tree on his land. The branches and leaves of the trees extended into the plaintiff’s land. The leaves of the tree are in fact poisonous to cows. The plaintiff’s horse ate the leaves and died. The court held the defendant liable as planting a poisonous tree is not a natural use of land. This decision may also be justified on the basic that an ‘escape’ of the tree had occurred as the branches and leaves had encroached onto plaintiff’s land.

In conclusion, there are four elements that need to be satisfied in order to proof that there is liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in strict liability.