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Private Nuisance

Friday, October 30, 2009

Private nuisance is an unlawful interference with a person's use,comfort,enjoyment & any interest that a person may have over his land. An interference becomes unlawful & constitutes a nuisance when it unreasonably interferes with the P's enjoyment of his land. The different between public n private nuisance was laid down in the case of MPPP v Boey Siew Than :
" a nuisance, is a public nuisance,if, within it sphere, which is the neighborhood, it materially affects the reasonable comfort & convenience of a class of the subjects of the state. A private nuisance, is one which disturbs the interest of some private individual in the use & enjoyment of his property by interference with the usual enjoyment of property by causing or permitting the escape of deleterious substances or things such as smoke, odours, & noise".

In action for private nuisance, the P must prove interference with the enjoyment of his land. ( a P must have an interest in land to be able to sue in private nuisance which does not require the P to have any interest over land). Person who have interest over land a landowner, a tenant & a licensee who has been granted a license to use the land for a particular purpose.


Public Nuisance

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Public Nuisance is an interference with public rights such as the obstruction of public highways or the selling of contaminated food. An action for negligence can also claim for public nuisance.

Definition of Public Nuisance
case: Attorney-General v PYA Quaries Ltd
-" public nuisance arises when an act materially affects the reasonable comfort & convenience the life of a class of the society".
other case: Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Boey Siew Than & Ors

Person who may claim (civil proceeding)
-only a person who has suffered special damage can claim for damages for public nuisance. P has to prove that he has suffered damages & injury over & above the ordinary convenience suffered by the public at large. The following factors may be used as a guidance to determine the existence of special particular damage:
(i) the type or extent of damage is more serious, The P must suffer more than what is suffered by other persons who are exposed to the same interference.
(ii) the damage must be a direct consequence & is substantial. Eg of direct damage: P suffers breathing problems due to D's smoke pollution. In the case of Pacific Engineering v Haji Ahmad Rice Mill, the P had proved that they suffered personal discomfort & injury to property thereby satisfying the requirement 'special damage'. An injunction preventing the D from burning rice husks in the compound of their premises was granted. The court held that in action for public nuisance, a P may institute proceeding without obtaining prior consent from the A-G if he suffered special damage.

If no special damage suffered by any particular individuals
-section 8(1) of Government Proceeding Act 1956 provides that the A-G, or two or more persons who have obtained written permission from the A-G, may institute a suit in public nuisance for a declaration & injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. In Koperasi Pasaraya Malaysia Bd v Uda Holdings Sdn Bhd, it was held that in action for public nuisance, consent must be first obtained from the A-G. Related case : Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Boey Siew Than.


Nuisance (Introduction)

Saturday, October 24, 2009

Nuisance is interference to the P's interest over his property & does not necessarily require entry by the D. To succeed the claim of nuisance, the P is generally required to prove special damage. Nuisance is distinguished from negligence. In the case of Wisma Punca Emas Sdn Bhd v Dr Donal, the Supreme court held that negligence is not a requirements in nuisance actions & therefore a P need not prove any negligence in nuisance case. All that is necessarily to prove is special damage which would be damage to his property due to the activities of the D adjoining land.
Nuisance is also different from strict liability. In action for nuisance, generally the interference must be something that is continuous, wheres in an action under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher one single act of interference is sufficient. The rule in Rylands v Fletcher applies only to case where there has been some special use of land bringing with it increased danger to others.

Damage & remedies.
The harm or damage that usually occurs in nuisance cases are 2 types:
(i) damage to property (easily identifiable)
(ii) interference to personal comfort (specific to the tort of nuisance)
The remedy usually sought in a claim for nuisance is an injunction. ( prevent the nuisance from continuing or monetary compensation which is usually granted for damage to property)
In the case of Pacific Engineering Ltd v Haji Ahmad Rice Mill Ltd, it was held that a person injured by a nuisance may bring an action & claim damages for the injury alone together claim for injunction.
-damaged must be proved in action for nuisance for otherwise the action will fail. The damage also must be reasonably foreseeable to arises from the D wrongful conduct.

-Reasonableness - In the case of Syarikat Perniagaan Selangor Sdh Bhd v Fahro Rozi Mohdi & Ors, the court held that a person may use his property in a reasonable way but no one has the right to intense noise just as no one should be asked to put up with such volume which by any reasonable standard becomes a nuisance. So the ordinary use of residential property is not capable of amounting the nuisance...-to be continue..:>


defamation (part 2)

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Types of defamation:

Libel- defamation in a permanent form & is usually visible to the eye, such as item in writing which includes e-mail, pictures,statues of effigies.
Section 3 of the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 provides that the broadcasting of words by means of radio communication shall be treated as publication & permanent form & therefore constitutes a libel. Libel is actionable per se, ( P need not to prove any damage). A bank commits the tort of defamation if it wrongfully prints the words "Account close" on a cheque that it is in fact bound to honours (Ng Cheng Kiat v Overseas Union Bank).

Slander- defamation in a temporary or transient form. Publication is usually made through spoken words or gestures. Slander is not an actionable per se, the P need to prove actual or special damage in order to succeed his action.

Actual damages- refer to actual financial loss or any loss that may be measured in monetary terms. Example: the loss of business or employment or even a chance to attend a dinner may be calculated in monetary terms & therefore constitute actual damage. The actual lost must be proved.The damage must also be the natural & reasonably foreseeable result of the D's words. In action for slander, the P must prove the actual words used. In the case of Rainy v Bravo, the court held that " if the defamatory writing does not exist, & secondary evidence is offered of its contents,the words must be prove & not what the witness conceived to be the subtance or the effect of them,..."

Exception to the requirement of actual damage in cases of slander.
1. slander to women
In the case of Luk Kai Lam v Sim Ai Keng, the respondent called the appellant a prostitute & said that the appellant charged RM50 to entertain men at any one time. These allegations were made in presence of a third party. The court held that since the words impugned the appellant's chastity, special damage need not be proven. Slander was established.
Section 4 of the Malaysian Defamation Act provides that the publication of words which imputes unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl requires no proof of special damage for the action to succeed.

2. Slander in relation to a person's professional or business reputation.
Section 5 provides:
" In an action for slander in respect of words calculated to
disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or
business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication,
it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damage whether
or not the words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office,
profession, calling, trade or business
In the case of John Tan Chor-Yong v Lee Chay Tian, P who was a advocated & solicitor claimed that the D words to the P's friends & clients to the effect that he, the P, was owing him, the D, several months rent were defamatory as the words were calculate to disparage him in his office. Applying s. 5 of the Defamation Act in favour of the P, & so holding that the P's case was actionable per se without proof or special damage.(cases related: Worker's Party v Tay Boon Too,JB Jayaratnam v Goh Chock Tong).

3. Slander in relation to title, slander of goods & malicious falsehood
Section 6 :
(1) In any action for slander of title, slander of goods or other
malicious falsehood, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove
special damage—
(a) if the words upon which the action is founded are calculated
to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published
in writing or other permanent form; or
(b) if the said words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage
to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling,
trade or business held or carried on by him at the time
of the publication
(2) Section 3 of this Act shall apply for the purposes of this
section as it applies for the purposes of the law of libel and
Example : If A writes a letter advising B not to order C's Kuey tiow for B's open
house function, as A believes C uses than fresh ingredients, C may have a claim against A under s.6 (1)(a) for slander of goods. If A on the other hand orally informs B of the same about C's Kuey teow, C has claim against A under s.6 (1)(b). In the case of Borneo Post Sdn Bhd v Sarawak Press Sdn Bhd, it was held that in action for slander of goods under s.6, the P must prove that the statement was published maliciously. The same requirement applies in action for slander of title-the alleged statement must disparaging the goods.

Malicious falsehood
-malice must be proved in a cause of action for malicious falsehood. In the case of Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors, the court held (following Clerk & Lindsell on Torts) in a claim for malicious falsehood, the P must proved :
(i)that the D has published about the P, words which are false &
(ii)that they were published maliciously, &
(iii)special damage has followed as the direct & natural result of the publication (must be proven except when s.6 applies)

Example: if A tells B that C is no longer operating his coffe-shop, the statement may well deprive C of his business & C in this instance may sue A for malicious falsehood without having to prove special damage provided C can proved that A was acting maliciously.
If A on the other hand tells B that C has left the country, & so B does not extend an invitation to C for the grand reception, B is holding for his daughter wedding, in order to succeed in a claim for malicious falsehood, C must proved special or actual damage.
The different from the torts of defamation from malicious falsehood is that defamation protects the claimant reputation while malicious falsehood protects the clamaint's interest in his property or trade.. In the case of Joyce v Sengupta, the court held that damages for anxiety & distress are not recoverble for malicious falsehood.

4.Imputation of contagious disease
- actionable per se
-the words must infer that the P suffers from such a disease at the time the publication is made, such venereal diseas.

5. Imputation of crime
Slander is actionable per se if the words that the P is involved in a crime. The crime must be one which attracts corporal punishment, which includes the death penalty, whipping or imprisonment. In the case of C Sivanathan v Abdullah bin Dato Hj. Abdul Rahman, the D called the P a cheat, dishonest & a liar. The court held that since the "crimes" did not attract corporal punishment, the P claim was not actionable per se. His action failed as he could not prove special or actual damage.



defamation arises when there is a publication which has a tendency to lower the person's reputation or to cause him to be shunned or avoided by reasonable persons in society, and thereby adversely affecting his reputation( Dato Musa Hitam v S H Alattas & Ors). It is established if A tells B either orally or in writing that C is dishonest and selfish person who likes to take advantages of those around him. Publication arises when this statement is made to B, and as this statement may cause a reasonable person to disassociate himself from C's company, it therefore adversely affects C's reputation.
In the case of Derbyshire County Council V Times Newspaper Ltd, it was held that a local authority and so (public authorities and governmental bodies) had no right to sue for defamation in respect of governing and administrative reputation if no actual financial loss was pleaded or alleged.
It's different from the business or commercial organization,a trading or non-trading corporation which can show that it has a corporate reputation which is capable of being damaged by a defamatory statement, may sue in libel to protect that reputation in the same way as could a natural person.
In Borneo Post Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sarawak Press Sdn Bhd case's, the P's action failed as the alleged defamatory statements did not contain any specific reference to the P company and there's could not be said to have reflected upon it's way of business.


Kidnapping offences in Malaysia

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

The word “kidnapping”, which seems to be derived from the words “kid” which means a child, and “nap or nab”, which means “to steal”, originally meant “child-stealing”. But now, it simply means he carrying away of a person against his will or if he or she is a minor, against the will of his or her lawful guardian.

Section 359 of Penal Code simply declares that kidnapping is of two kinds, namely kidnapping from Malaysia and kidnapping from lawful guardianship which are defined in the next Section 360 and Section 361 respectively and both of which are made punishable alike by Section 363 of Penal Code.

The classification of kidnapping in this section is not exhaustive as there may be cases in which the two kinds overlap each other. For instance, a minor may be kidnapped from Malaysia as well from his or her lawful guardianship.

Before that it is important to determine the element of actus reus and mens rea of the accused before we can make the accused liable under those sections. To prove the actus reus, it must be proven that the accused have acted unlawfully either by force or fraud, to lead or to take away or decoy or entice the person from one place to another. While the mens rea is with intent to deprive any parent, guardian, or other person having lawful care or custody of such person of the possession.
For kidnapping from Malaysia there must proved the following elements
1. that at the time of the offence, the person kidnapped was in Malaysia
2. that the person was conveyed by the accused beyond the limits of Malaysia
3. that the accused did so without the consent of that person, or some person legally authorized to consent on that person’s behalf

This section also mentioned that there was no age limitation therefore it can be applied to anyone.

According to section 360 of Penal Code: Kidnapping from Malaysia

Whoever conveys any person beyond the limits of Malaysia without the consent of that person, or of some person legally authorized to consent on behalf of that person, is said to kidnap that person from Malaysia”.
The elements in this section that must be proved are:
• Victim must be in Malaysia
• Conveyance of a person
• Beyond the limits of Malaysia
• Without the consent of that person or some person legally authorized to consent on behalf of that person
In this section, there was no age limitation therefore it can be applied to anyone.

Before that, it is very important to look at the definition or what is amounted to the offence of kidnapping.

The word “to convey” in this section means to “carry from one place to another”. The conveyance or carrying is a continuous process until the destination is reached. In the case of an offence under this section, the destination may be some place in a foreign territory, but it is not necessary that it should be reached. The offence is complete as soon as the limits of Malaysia are crossed.

“Any person”. The use of the word “any” before “person” indicates that the person kidnapped may be a male or female, major or minor, sane or insane, and a citizen of Malaysia or a foreign subject.

“Beyond the limits of Malaysia”. These words in this section, indicate that for an offence under it, the kidnapping or conveyance must be from some place, within the limits of Malaysia to some place outside those limits. The offence is not completed until the person is conveyed to some place outside Malaysia and until such time, the offence is going on, but is capable of being abetted.

Regarding the consent in this section, it is also an important element in kidnapping but a consent given under a misapprehension of fact, is not a true consent as mentioned in section 90 of Penal Code.

Section 90 of Penal Code stated that

A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code-
(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception;
(b) the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives hi consent; or
(c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by person who is under 12 years of age.

Meanwhile, in section 361 of Penal Code provided for kidnapping from lawful guardianship.

In section 361 of Penal Code: Kidnapping from lawful guardianship

Whoever takes or entices any minor under fourteen years of age if a male, or under sixteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship”.

The words “lawful guardian” in this section includes any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person. But this section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.

This section defines the second kind of kidnapping, namely, kidnapping from lawful guardianship. This is kidnapping in the literal sense of the term “child-stealing”. Obviously, the section applies only to the kidnapping of a minor, or of a person of unsound mind whether male or female. The law does not permit even a girl of easy virtues to be taken away from lawful guardianship without the consent of parents, the object of the section being to provide security and protection to the wards themselves. Persuasion by the accused, which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, would sufficient to attract this section.

The offence of kidnapping under section 361 of Penal Code consists solely of taking or enticing a minor from the keeping of her or his lawful guardian and no intention on the part of the accused is required to be established. The consent of a minor, who is taken or enticed, is wholly immaterial. It does not affect the commission of the offence though it is a matter for consideration under the question of sentence. The motive of the kidnapper is also immaterial unless it falls within the Exception to the section. Motive is however an important consideration with reference to the question of punishment.

All that is needed is the minor under fourteen in the case of a male, or under sixteen in the case of female, is taken or enticed from the keeping of the lawful guardian. The moment a child is taken out of the keeping of his or her lawful guardian, the offence of kidnapping is complete, the criminal intention being not a necessary ingredient for making out this offence.

Since the offence under this section consists in taking or enticing a minor, or a person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of a lawful guardian, it has no application to the taking, or enticing, of a minor, or a person of unsound mind, who has no guardian, whether legal, lawful or de facto. But the person taking away such a child, may himself become the lawful guardian of the child and any other person, taking or enticing the child out of his keeping, may be guilty of kidnapping.

To constitute an offence of kidnapping of a minor under section 361 of Penal Code, the essential ingredients that must be fulfilled are:
• there must be taking or enticing of a minor;
• the minor must be under fourteen years of age if a male, or under sixteen years of age if a female;
• the taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of the minor; and
• the taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian.

Taking or enticing away a minor, or a person of unsound mind out of the keeping of a lawful guardian which is an essential element of the offence of kidnapping. Without a taking or enticing there can be no kidnapping. The section requires either taking or enticing, and not both.

Taking need not be by force whether actual or constructive as it implies neither force nor misrepresentation, nor fraud. According to Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, the word “take” merely means “to cause to go”, “to escort” or “to get into possession”. While the word “entices” is an idea of inducement by exciting hope or desire in the other. No doubt it does mean physical taking but not necessarily by use of force or fraud. Persuasion by the accused person, which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, would be sufficient to attract this section. According to the case of Sayyad Abdul Satar v. Emporer (1928) AIR Madras 585, the taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian. There must be some act or a series of acts on the part of the accused which maybe regarded as the proximate cause of the person going out of the keeping of the guardian.

Taking need not be constituted by a single act. A whole series of acts may together constitute the process of taking. So the question, whether the “taking” of a minor out of the custody of her lawful guardian was or was not complete at a given moment, is a question for determination with reference to the circumstances proved in each particular case. Speaking generally, the keeping of the guardian is at an end when the person on his behalf, into the custody of some person, not entitled to the custody of the minor. Thus, the act of taking is complete when the accused takes the minor with him or accompanies him in the ordinary sense of the term, irrespective of his or her mental attitude. In order to prove the offence of kidnapping from the lawful guardianship under section 361 of Penal Code, it must be proved that the accused had taken the minor out of the keeping of her lawful guardian.


Vicarious Liability

To claim under the tort of vicarious liability, firstly, we should know all the requirement of vicarious liability should be establish first in order to claim under the tort of vicarious liability. The requirements are as the following:
1. There must be a wrongful tortious act
2. There must be special relationship between employee-employer
3. The tort must occur within the course of employment

For the first requirements they must be a wrongful tortuous act such as negligence. The second requirements is there must be special relationship, the relationship is about the relationship of employee-employer. There must be special relationship between the D and the tortfeasor. If a tort is commit on the D premise but not by his employee he cannot be vicariously liable for the tort(Ravindran a/l Kunji Kuttan vs TNB Behad). A person who is in contract of services is an employee whereas one who in a contract for services is an independent contractor. An independent contractor is one who works under a contract for service. The last requirements must fulfill the tort must occur within the course of employment, an employer is only vicarious liability for the tort of his employee which occur in the course of employment. Conduct is said to be within the course of employment if firstly is either expressly or impliedly allowed by the employer, when the employee does something that is authorize in an unauthorized manner or thirdly, the employee does something that is closely connect to what he is employed to do, in the course of doing the job. The term “within the course of employment” can also be in a situation such as carelessness of workers in the performance of his job and acting against employers express prohibition.
In the case of Rosahiree Abdul Wahab VS Mejar Mustafa Omar and ORS. The court held that although D1 act were unauthorized, they were carried out during his normal course of duty. Therefore the act were so connect with his authorized act that they constituted modes, albeit in proper, of doing authorized act. This was especially so as the plaintiff was directly under the charge, supervision and controlled of D1, the court reaffirmed the principle that master is responsible not merely for what he authorized his servant to do but also for the in which the way they perform it. The government was not liable for D2 acts as he was not assigned any official duty towards the plaintiff and so his act were independent.
In the case of Iqbal Vs London Transport Executives, D is not vicarious For his employee (Bus conductor) where his employee was negligence during driving the bus and the driver doesn’t follow the order. In Twine v Beans Express LTD, the employee acting contrary to his employers instruction, gave a lift to a third party who was subsequently injured due to the negligence of the employee. The employee was not vicariously liable as giving free lift was not the job the employee was employed to do and therefore he was acting outside the scope of his employment. Moreover, in Chuan Seng and CO Pinaple Factory v Idris and Anor, the defendant employee gave a lift to two person in his lorry, an accident occurred in which the two person died. The defendant was found not vicariously liable. The court follow the dicta in Twine v Beans Express LTD and stated that giving a lift was outside the scope of employment as the driver was prohibit from giving lift to other person. In Conway v George Winmpey and Co, the driver of a lorry acting against clear oral instruction of his employers, took a passenger on to the lorry. There was a notice in the lorry indicating that the driver was under strict orders not to carry passengers other then employee of the company and anyone driving on the vehicles did so at it his own risk. The passenger was subsequently injured by the negligence driving of the lorry driver and in action against the employer, the court held that the passenger to be a trespasser and therefore no duty was owed to him by the employer.
Street on Tort suggest that the employers liabilities in case of an authorized passenger sustaining injury due to negligence driving of an employee should not be base on the fact that the passenger is a trespasser. The issue remains whether the prohibition against giving lift is outside the scope of employment or merely an authorized way of performing the employees work.


Sleeping Partner

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

What is sleeping partner? Before we look at the meaning of it we should know that actually there is two types of partner which are the active partner and the passive partner. An active or general partner is a partner that take an active part in the management of the business in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, to the contrary. Meanwhile, passive partners or usually reformed to as a sleeping partner or dormant partner. A passive usually has no say in the administration or management of the firm or in easy words is dormant partners takes no active part in the management of the business. A dormant partner also, is commonly, but not necessarily, a concealed partner. His concealment however does not give him any special immunity from the liability of partners for aspect performed by any partner within the scoped of apparent authority. A concealed partner will be liable in the same way as an “ordinary” partner. if we look at the section 26 (e) of the Partnership Act 1961. Section 26(e) give the right to each partner to participate in the business of firm . Section 26 (e) provides that :
Section 26 (e) :
Every partner may take part in the management of the partnership business”.
Although section 26 (e) give the right to each partner to participate in the business of firm. This section actually not applicable to every partner that joined the business. I mean that not every partners have the skill, talent , interest or tendency in the management of the firm. Sometimes, it is better if the management itself need the proper or skilled partners or a manager that have being paid to manage the firm. So, the relation of this section to sleeping partner of a firm may be the persons who are not have skill or fully knowledge of the management of the firm. So, sleeping partner may only give the capital to support the firm business while the management of the firm will be manage by the partners who have skills and intellectual knowledge of business.
Furthermore, if we look at the section 26(e), it is importance to explain the words “may take part” in the management of the partnership business”. The word “may” is not a must or an obligatory to every partner to take part in management of their business.
In the case of Pooley v Driver, as considered by Jessel M.R. that there could even be a dormant or sleeping partner who neither contributed capital, nor skill nor anything else. If a a dormant/ sleeping partner’s name is neither in the firm’s business name nor registered with the Registry of Business Names, he may not imposed liability on his co-partners, and such a partner cannot be responsible for acts of another co-partner acting outside the scope of his powers. Jessel M.R. also defined that the dormant partners is a person who does not take an active part in the conduct of the business, and who may be, and often is, prohibiting from takin such part. Moreover, in the case of Beckam v Drake, the court held that sleeping partners liable for those acts of his co-partners, which not made in the course of the firm business since the sleeping partner do not known to the outside world as a partner, his act bind the firm where he has no actual authority to do that. So, from the two cases given we can understand that sleeping partner also is a partnership of the business which a sleeping partner also may be liable in the same way like as an active partner.


Defence in strict liability

There are 6 defences can be used by defendant in strict liability. First is ‘consent’ of the plaintiff. Consent of the plaintiff means that if the plaintiff either expressly or impliedly consents to the existence of the dangerous thing and the defendant is not negligent in any way, the defendant will not be liable for any escape and resulting damage.

Second defence that can be used is ‘common benefit’ whereby if the dangerous thing is allowed to exist for the common benefit of both the plaintiff and the defendant will not be held liable if it escapes and causes damages.

The third defence under strict liability is ‘act of third party’. The test used to determine whether a person is a third party or otherwise is whether that person acts outside the defendant’s control. However, even if the act is outside the defendant’s control, the defendant may still be held liable if he ought reasonably to have foreseen the act of third party. Generally trespasser and those who act on land does not belong to the defendant are said to be the third parties. The defendant’s workers or employees as well as any independent contractor employed by him will not be regarded as third party.

Next is ‘act of God’ which is an operation of natural forces “which no human foresight can provide against, and if which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility”. But this is not to say that the defendant will escape liability merely because the event is not reasonable foreseeable.

Besides, the defence that can be used by defendant under strict liability is the ‘plaintiff’s default’. If the damage caused by the plaintiff’s own action or wrongdoing, he will not be compensated. If the plaintiff contributes to the end of damage he may be held to be contributory negligence under s 12(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 .

The last defence is ‘statutory authority’. Liability will not be imposed on a defendant who acts under the authority of a statute which excludes liability for such acts. If a statute imposes a duty on the defendant to do something which consequently causes damage to the plaintiff, the defendant will not be held liable. On the other hand if the statue only gives a power of discretion to the defendant, the defendant may still be held liable if he is found to be careless in exercising his discretionary power.:>


Strict Liability under Tort

Strict liability, sometimes called absolute liability, is the legal responsibility for damages, or injury, even if the person found strictly liable was not at fault or negligent. Strict liability means that although the defendant might have taken all reasonable precautions to avoid or minimize risks arising from his activity, he may still be found liable if the tort which has arisen falls under the category of strict liability torts. Unlike the defendant in a cause of action for intentional torts, the mental state of a defendant in a strict liability action is irrelevant. It is not a requirement that the defendant must intend to do an act which is alleged to give rise to the tort of strict liability.

Strict liability can also arise in a cause of action for breach of statutory duty but the strictness of liability would very much depend on the wording of the relevant statutory provisions. Strict liability often applies to those engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous ventures. A classic example of strict liability is the owner of a tiger rehabilitation center. No matter how strong the tiger cages are, if an animal escapes and causes damage and injury, the owner is held liable. Another example is a contractor hiring a demolition subcontractor that lacks proper insurance. If the subcontractor makes a mistake, the contractor is strictly liable for any damage that occurs.

Actually, there are many categories of strict liability such as animal liability, product liability which was stated in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products , and liability of a bank for making payment on forged instruments of its customer such as in the case of United Asia Bank v. Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd . However, I would only discuss this branch of tort law according to the landmark case of Ryland v. Fletcher

In this case, the defendants employed independent contractors to build a dam on land they occupied. Unbeknown-st to them, the dam was constructed over five unused mine shafts, which led into the underground working of an old mine. There was a connection between these workings and the workings of the plaintiff’s mines. When the reservoir was filled the water burst into the shafts and flowed into the plaintiff’s mines, and the plaintiff sought to recover damages.

Blackburn J in the Court of Exchequer Chamber said:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default: or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.

The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining his own property.

But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, of filth, or stenches.”

This case went on appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber was upheld. Lord Cairns in the House of Lords further added that the rule only applied where the defendant had used his land for a non-natural use.

Basically, the law imputes strict liability to situations it considers to be inherently dangerous. It discourages reckless behavior and needless loss by forcing potential defendants to take every possible precaution. It also has the effect of simplifying litigation and allowing the victim to become whole more quickly. However, liability in the tort of strict liability is not absolute as there are defences. Besides, the defendant is only liable for the foreseeable consequences of the escape of a dangerous thing in the course of a non-natural use of the land.

There are four elements required to establish strict liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher rule which are dangerous objects, intentional of storage, escape and non-natural use of the land.


The object or thing must be dangerous and the rule applies to anything that may cause damage if it escapes. The object or thing therefore, need not be dangerous per se because there are objects which are safe if a dangerous object and this element is fulfilled. This principle has been successfully applied to gas, noxious fumes explosives, fire, electricity, water, sewage and slag heaps. Whether the object is considered dangerous in that it may cause damage if it escape is determined through the ordinary experience of mankind.

In Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor the plaintiff rented a shop house and lived on the first floor of the building of repairing and distributing tyres. The defendant also stored petrol for the purpose of his business. One morning the defendant’s premise caught fire. The fire spread to the first floor and the plaintiff’s wife and child died in that tragedy. The court held the defendant liable under the rule in Rylands v Flecther as the petrol was a dangerous object.


The rule only applies to an object or thing which the defendant purposely keeps and collects. In other word the defendant will only be liable if he has accumulated the object. It is applicable to anything that is naturally on the land. It follows that when something that is naturally on the land escapes and cause damage, the occupier will not be liable unless he intentionally allows the escape to occur or that the escape is foreseeable and yet the defendant does nothing to prevent the probable escape.

In Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co Ltd the defendant used some explosives to break some rock on his land. Some of the rocks fell below the land and injured the plaintiff. The rocks were not purposely collected or kept on the land but the explosives were purposely collected and kept. Yet the defendant was held liable for escape of the rocks because the way in which the injury was sustained was through rock blasting, which was not a natural use of land.


The rule is applicable only when there is an escape. Escape means the object has escaped from a place where the defendant has control and authority to a place where the defendant has no control and authority to a place where the defendant has no control and authority.

In Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Manchester the defendants were held liable when an explosion on their property caused inflammable gas escape into the plaintiff’s house and consequently set fire to the plaintiff’s property. The meaning of escape has been extended to include a situation where the use of the dangerous object causes or create an event from which damage is sustained.


An ordinary or natural use of land would include erecting a house, installing water, electric wiring and gas pipes. It also include doing something ordinary and natural, through artificial, such as constructing a fish pond. The meaning of non-natural use of land was explained in the cases of Rickards v Lothian where the Lord Moulton stated: “It must be some special bringing with it increased danger to other and must not merely be the ordinary of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.”

Lord Porter in the case of Read v Lyons & Co Ltd said that all factors such as time, location and the ordinary activities of mankind must be taken into consideration, so what is dangerous or constitutes a non-natural use of land may differ in different circumstance. In Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board the defendant planted a yew tree on his land. The branches and leaves of the trees extended into the plaintiff’s land. The leaves of the tree are in fact poisonous to cows. The plaintiff’s horse ate the leaves and died. The court held the defendant liable as planting a poisonous tree is not a natural use of land. This decision may also be justified on the basic that an ‘escape’ of the tree had occurred as the branches and leaves had encroached onto plaintiff’s land.

In conclusion, there are four elements that need to be satisfied in order to proof that there is liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in strict liability.


Undang-undang Jenayah..sambungan

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Mens Rea dalam Pakat Jahat

Dalam perkara ini, pihak-pihak dalam pakat jahat jenayah mestilah berhasrat atau berniat supaya perjanjian mereka dilaksanakan. Perjanjian tersebut mestilah sama ada untuk melakukan perbuatan yang tidak sah atau untuk melakukan perbuatan yang sah melalui cara yang tidak sah. Objek atau cara yang digunakan adalah tidak sah ditakrifkan di bawah seksyen 43 Kanun Keseksaan. Suatu perbezaan di antara perjanjian sama ada objeknya atau cara yang digunakan adalah tidak sah tetapi tidak menjadikannya suatu kesalahan. Dalam kes-kes yang terdahulu, suatu pakat jahat jenayah akan lengkap melalui perbuatan perjanjian sementara dalam kes-kes yang terkemudian, ianya mestilah wujud suatu perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh pihak-pihak kepada perjanjian itu bagi memberi kesan kepada objeknya iaitu mestilah wujud suatu perbuatan secara terang-terangan.
Bagi membuktikan pertuduhan pakat jahat, pengetahuan menurut keinginan sama ada suatu perbuatan yang tidak sah atau perbuatan yang sah melalui cara yang tidak sah adalah diperlukan. Dalam sesetengah kes, niat bagi kegunaan yang tidak sah dibuat terhadap barang-barang atau perkhidmatan yang dipersoalkan boleh disimpulkan daripada pengetahuan itu sendiri. Pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu untuk membuktikan niat suatu penggunaan yang tidak sah selagi mana barang-barang atau perkhidmatan yang menjadi persoalan itu tidak boleh diletakkan kepada mana-mana penggunaan yang sah. Jika kesalahan utama itu mengandungi berbagai-bagai tindakan maka adalah tidak perlu bagi pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan bahawa setiap pihak pakat jahat mempunyai pengetahuan apa yang akan pelaku itu lakukan selagi mana diketahui bahawa pelaku tersebut akan meletakkan barang-barang atau perkhidmatan kepada penggunaan yang tidak sah.
Dalam kes Churchill v Walton [1967] 1 All E.R. 497, mahkamah menyatakan mens rea adalah hanya merupakan intipati yang diperlukan dalam suatu pakat jahat iaitu mestilah wujud niat untuk menjadi pihak kepada suatu perjanjian untuk melakukan perbuatan yang tidak sah. Maka, adalah perlu untuk menumpukan kepada terma atau kesan perjanjian yang dibuat oleh pihak-pihak pakat jahat itu. Persoalannya adalah “Apa yang mereka persetujui untuk melakukan?” Sekiranya apa yang dipersetujui untuk dilakukan adalah berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang diketahui oleh mereka iaitu suatu perbuatan yang tidak sah, mereka adalah bersalah kerana pakat jahat. Begitu juga dalam kes Yash Pal Mital v State of Punjap, AIR [1977] Punjap 189, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak-pihak pakat jahat mestilah bertindak dengan satu objek untuk mencapai hasil sebenar yang mana setiap mereka adalah mengetahuinya dan yang mana setiap mereka juga mempunyai kepentingan dan niat di mana semestinya wujud persamaan objek atau tujuan.
Adalah penting untuk dinyatakan di sini bahawa keperluan pihak-pihak pakat jahat berhasrat untuk melakukan suatu kesalahan tidaklah bermakna bahawa setiap pihak pakat jahat mesti berniat untuk melakukan perbuatan tersebut bagi menjadikannya kesalahan yang lengkap. Di sini, apa yang diperlukan adalah pada masa perjanjian tersebut dilakukan, setiap pihak dalam pakat jahat mesti berniat supaya kesalahan jenayah itu dilakukan dan dia akan melaksanakan peranannya dalam perjanjian itu walaupun peranan tersebut tidak lebih dari hanya bersetuju supaya kesalahan jenayah itu dilakukan oleh orang lain.
Suatu perjanjian bagi melakukan sesuatu perbuatan yang sah melalui cara yang tidak sah adalah merupakan suatu pakat jahat. Apabila suatu perjanjian yang bukan untuk perlakuan suatu kesalahan, maka perbuatan secara terang-terangan menurut pakat jahat adalah diperlukan. Dalam hal ini, undang-undang tidak mengambil kira mengenai niat atau pemikiran pesalah. Justeru, mestilah wujud suatu perbuatan secara terang-terangan bagi menjelaskan sesuatu niat. Suatu perbuatan secara terang-terangan dalam menjadikan suatu pakat jahat merupakan perbuatan sama ada menandakan suatu perjanjian atau persediaan perbuatan bagi suatu kesalahan atau perbuatan yang menjadikan suatu kesalahan. Oleh yang demikian, suatu perbuatan secara terang-terangan dalam kes pakat jahat mengandungi perjanjian pihak-pihak untuk melakukan perbuatan yang tidak sah ataupun melakukan perbuatan yang sah melalui cara yang tidak sah.
Berdasarkan statut di England pula, iaitu di bawah seksyen 1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977, seksyen ini telah membuat tanggapan tentang kewujudan niat pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam pakat jahat untuk melaksanakan perjanjian yang telah dibuat. Maka, di sini asas kesalahan melakukan pakat jahat jenayah ialah niat untuk meneruskan perbuatan yang dilarang itu Dalam kes Anderson [1986] AC 27, defendan dalam kes ini telah disabitkan atas kesalahan membuat komplot dengan beberapa orang yang lain bagi menolong salah seorang daripada mereka untuk melarikan diri daripada penjara. Defendan dikatakan telah bersetuju untuk menyediakan alat-alat bagi memotong pagar besi dipenjara tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, dia telah menyatakan bahawa dia tidak berniat untuk meneruskan rancangan tersebut kerana dia percaya rancangan itu adalah mustahil untuk berjaya. Dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa keadaan tersebut tidak boleh dijadikan sebagai suatu pembelaan. Memang jelas di sini bahawa dua atau lebih orang yang melakukan komplot itu memang berniat untuk meneruskan rancangan mereka. Oleh itu, sabitan terhadap defendan adalah disahkan atas alasan bahawa dia telah membantu serta bersubahat dalam pakat jahat itu. Hal ini memang dilakukan olehnya iaitu melalui sokongan serta bantuan yang telah ditawarkan olehnya.
Menurut Lord Bridge dalam kes Anderson, mens rea bagi kesalahan komplot boleh dibuktikan jika ditunjukkan bahawa semasa mengikat perjanjian tersebut, pihak tertuduh telah mengambil bahagian dalam perbuatan yang telah dijanjikan bagi tujuan meneruskan tujuan jenayah yang diniatkan itu atau dengan kata lain wujud niat untuk melibatkan diri dalam melaksanakan perjanjian tersebut di pihak tertuduh. Namun tiada apa-apa keperluan dalam seksyen ini ataupun dalam common law yang memerlukan setiap pihak yang terlibat dalam suatu pakat jahat untuk mengambil bahagian secara aktif bagi melaksanakan pakat jahat tersebut. Jadi, apa yang perlu disini ialah perlakuan kesalahan yang telah dilakukan oleh seseorang atau lebih daripada pihak-pihak yang berurusan dengan perjanjian tersebut.
Seksyen 1(2) Criminal Law Act 1977 pula menyatakan tentang komplot untuk melakukan kesalahan tanggungan keras.. Peruntukan ini bertujuan untuk menentukan konsep liabiliti ketat dan kesemberonoan berkaitan dengan keadaan tidak termasuk di bawah kesalahan komplot. Niat atau pengetahuan kepada semua keadaan berkenaan memerlukan actus reus walaupun perjanjian yang terlibat adalah untuk melakukan jenayah yang mungkin dilakukan melalui perbuatan secara melulu atau jenayah liabiliti ketat. Dalam hal ini, telah diperuntukkan secara nyata bahawa ia hanya terpakai kepada jenayah komplot. Seksyen 1(2) pula telah membuat peruntukkan yang nyata bahawa kedua-dua pihak yang berurusan dalam perjanjian tersebut mestilah mempunyai mens rea. Maka, tidak terdapat pakat jahat untuk melakukan jenayah tertentu melainkan terdapat sekurang-kurangnya dua pihak yang berurusan dengan perjanjian tersebut yang memang berniat untuk melaksanakan jenayah itu.
Bagi komplot untuk melakukan fraud, House of Lord dalam kes Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819 telah menyatakan bahawa adalah jelas perjanjian secara tidak jujur oleh dua pihak atau lebih untuk mengambil sesuatu yang dipunyai oleh orang lain dan perjanjian secara tidak jujur itu bertujuan untuk menyalahgunakan hak milik pihak itu, maka ini adalah mencukupi untuk membentuk satu kesalahan komplot untuk memfraud. Walau bagaimanapun, mens rea dalam komplot untuk melakukan fraud mesti juga dibuktikan. Lord Diplock dalam kes Scott telah menyatakan bahawa apabila mangsa yang dimaksudkan dalam ‘komplot untuk melakukan fraud’ adalah individu tertentu, maka tujuan pihak yang melakukan komplot tersebut mestilah untuk menyebabkan kerugian dari segi ekonomi terhadap mangsa yang terlibat iaitu melalui pelucutan hartanya atau untuk menggunakan harta zahir atau harta tak zahir yang dia berhak atau mungkin berhak.
Manakala dalam kes Cooke [1986] 2 All ER 985, pelayan Syarikat Kereta Api British telah menaiki kereta api bersama-sama dengan makanan yang disediakan oleh mereka untuk dijual kepada penumpang kereta api tersebut. Mereka sepatutnya menjual makanan yang telah disediakan oleh majikan mereka. Tujuan mereka berbuat demikian adalah untuk mendapat keuntungan dan menyimpan wang hasil daripada jualan tersebut. Mereka mungkin didapati bersalah di sisi undang-undang kerana telah berusaha untuk menipu penumpang kereta api berkenaan apabila mereka menjual makanan tersebut dan meletakkan tanda harga melalui penipuan. Tanpa mengambil kira perkara ini benar atau tidak, House of Lord tidak menghadapi kerumitan dalam membuat keputusan bahawa pihak yang terlibat bersalah atas melakukan komplot untuk memfraud Syarikat Kereta Api British. Walau bagaimanapun, adalah jelas bahawa tujuan pihak yang berkomplot dalam kes ini adalah untuk mendapatkan keuntungan daripada para penumpang dan bukannya untuk memfraud Syarikat Kereta Api British. Tetapi, House of Lord mungkin berpendapat bahawa pihak juri boleh memutuskan yang tertuduh mesti mengetahui bahawa kelakuan mereka akan menyebabkan kerugian kepada syarikat tersebut. Sekiranya sedemikian, maka adalah betul untuk memutuskan bahawa mereka memang berniat untuk memfraud syarikat itu. Oleh sebab mereka tahu yang mereka hanya boleh mendapat keuntungan melalui kerugian orang lain, maka mereka memang berniat untuk menyebabkan kerugian tersebut.
Kesimpulannya, mens rea merupakan intipati yang penting dalam satu kesalahan pakat jahat jenayah. Maka, pihak pendakwaan mestilah berjaya membuktikan bahawa wujud mens rea di pihak tertuduh untuk menyabitkan kesalahan dalam pakat jahat jenayah khususnya niat untuk melaksanakan penjanjian mereka itu. Tambahan pula, kedua-dua pihak juga mesti dibuktikan mempunyai niat untuk melaksanakan perjanjian tersebut. Jika hanya seorang sahaja yang mempunyai mens rea tetapi satu pihak lagi gagal dibuktikan mempunyai mens rea, maka pihak-pihak itu akan terlepas daripada tuduhan pakat jahat jenayah.


Undang-undang Jenayah

Makna dan Takrif Pakatjahat.

Kebiasaannya orang ramai akan menganggap bahawa tindakan perlakuan sesuatu jenayah itu akan lebih berbahaya sekiranya dilakukan oleh gabungan beberapa orang jika hendak dibandingkan dengan perlakuan jenayah yang dilakukan oleh orang perseorangan. Ini kerana bilangan yang ramai dalam melakukan jenayah berupaya melakukan banyak kerosakan jika hendak dibandingkan dengan tindakan seorang sahaja, lebih-lebih lagi perlakuan itu lebih berbahaya sekiranya terdapat satu perjanjian untuk melakukan jenayah itu. Tambahan pula apabila wujud gabungan-gabungan di antara orang-orang ini , maka peluang untuk memecahkan kumpulan ini sangat tipis. Gabungan-gabungan untuk melakukan jenayah ini atau perlakuan jenayah secara beramai-ramai ini boleh dikatakan sebagai pakatjahat jenayah, iaitu berpakat untuk melakukan jenayah. Apakah itu pakat jahat jenayah?

Mengikut kamus Oxford Dictionary of Law Edisi Ke-6 menyatakan bahawa pakatjahat ialah “ an agreement between two or more people to behave in a manner that will automatically constitute an offence by at least one of them.” ( perjanjian di antara dua orang atau lebih untuk berkelakuan dalam cara yang akan mewujudkan kesalahan sekurang-kurangnya salah seorang daripada mereka.) Contohnya , 2 orang telah bersetuju, seorang mencuri dan seorang akan menunggu di dalam kereta untuk melarikan diri. Persetujuan itu dengan sendirinya telah menjadi satu kesalahan di bawah undang-undang yang boleh dihukum mengikut kesalahan yang dipersetujui walaupun kesalahan itu tidak dilakukan. Di negara kita, undang-undang tentang pakatjahat jenayah adalah terkandung di dalam seksyen 120A KK. Makna dan takrif pakatjahat jenayah adalah dinyatakan secara jelas dalam seksyen 120A KK.

Seksyen 120A : Takrif Pakatjahat Jenayah

Apabila dua orang atau lebih daripada dua orang bersetuju melakukan , atau menyebabkan supaya dilakukan :

(a) suatu perbuatan yang menyalahi undang-undang ; atau
(b) suatu perbuatan, yang tidak menyalahi undang – undang, dengan jalan yang menyalahi undang-undang,

maka persetujuan yang demikian itu adalah dinamakan pakatjahat jenayah:

Dengan syarat bahawa apa-apa persetujuan, kecuali suatu persetujuan bagi melakukan sesuatu kesalahan, tidaklah terjumlah kepada suatu pakatjahat jenayah melainkan jika sesuatu perbuatan selaindaripada persetujuan itu dilakukan oleh satu atau beberapa pihak yang membuat persetujuan itu pada menurut persetujuan itu.

Huraian – Maka tidaklah mustahak sama ada perbuatan yang menyalahi undang-undang itu adalah tujuan muktamad bagi persetujuan itu, atau cuma bersangkutan denagn tujuan itu.

Definisi seksyen 120A adalah bersamaan dengan keputusan Mahkamah dalam kes : Quinn lwn Leatham [1901] AC 495, 528 di mana Hakim Brampton menyatakan :
“ Sekiranya dua orang atau lebih bersetuju bersama-sama untuk melakukan sesuatu yang berlawanan dengan undang-undang atau menyalahi undang-undang atau berbahaya terhadap seorang lain, atau menggunakan cara-cara yang tidak sah dalam melaksanakan sesuatu objek yang bukan sebaliknya tidak sah, orang yang berjanji melakukan pakatjahat jenayah.”

Manakala dalam buku Halsbury’s Laws of England Edisi ke-4, vol.11. perenggan 58; muka surat 44 menyatakan :

suatu pakatjahat jenayah mengandungi perjanjian dua orang atau lebih orang untuk melakukan perbuatan yang tiadak sah atau melakukan sesuatu perbuatan yang sah melalui cara yang tidak sah…”

Di dalam suatu kesalahan pakatjahat jenayah, perkara yang penting adalah mengenai fakta gabungan oleh sesuatu perjanjian. Perjanjian tersebut boleh sama ada secara terus terang atau tersirat , atau sebahagiannya adalah secara nyataan dan sebahagiannya adalah secara tersirat. Suatu pakatjahat ini akan wujud dan kesalahan tersebut dilakukan sebaik sahaja perjanjian itu dibuat; dan kesalahan itu akan berterusan selagi mana gabungan itu terbatal setelah perlaksanaan perbuatan itu tamat ataupun setelah berputus asa atau kehampaan ataupun mana-mana di antaranya. Suatu Actus reus pakatjahat jenayah adalah suatu perjanjian untuk melakukan perbuatan yang tidak sah, dan bukannya perlaksanaan perbuatan itu. Di sini adalah perlu untuk menunjukkan pemikiran yang sama, persamaan untuk melakukan maksud yang tidak sah. Adalah tidak perlu setiap pihak pakatjahat jenayah berhubung antara satu sama lain. Bagaimanakah hal ini berlaku? Contoh bagi huraian ini ialah dalam rantaian pakatjahat ,. Di dalam rantaian pakatjahat ( chain conspiracy) atau putaran pakatjahat ( wheel conspiracy), D1 melakukan persetujuan dengan D2, D2 bersetuju dengan D3, D3 bersetuju dengan D4 dan seterusnya. Di dalam hal ini. D1 adalah ‘hub’ atau pusat bagi rantaian pakatjahat tersebut di mana dia mengarah atau merekrut D2, D3 dan D4 mengikut rancangannya. Di sini dapat dilihat bahawa adalah tidak perlu setiap pihak tersebut berhung atau mengenali antara satu sam lain untuk menjadikan suatu pakatjahat itu sesuatu yang sah. . Yang penting di sini ialah setiap pihak yang terlibat mestilah mempunyai objek yang sama untuk melakukan pakatjahat tersebut

Di dalam kes Amrita Lal Hazra [1914] 42 Cal 957, kesalahan pakatjahat merupakan kesalahan yang tersendiri dan telah ditetapkan undang-undang. Menurut seksyen 120A menyebut bahawa adalah menjadi suatu jenayah pakatjahat jika dua orang atau lebih bersetuju ( sama ada dengan berjanji, perakuan dan sehati atau seumpamanya) untuk melakukan suatu perbuatan yang menyalahi undang-undang atau dengan jalan yang mnyalahi undang-undang. Ini bermakna suatu “persetujuan” sahaja sudah cukup untuk menghukum seseorang di bawah seksyen 120A KK, walaupun sesuatu perbuatan yang menyalahi undang-undang itu tidak dilakukan.

Seksyen 120B KK pula adalah tentang hukuman kepada pesalah yang disabitkan di atas tuduhan pakatjahat jenayah.

Seksyen 120B : Seksaan bagi Pakatjahat jenayah

(1) Barangsiapa menjadi suatu pihak dalam suatu pakatjahat jenayah bagi melakukan kesalah yang boleh diseksa dengan bunuh, atau penjara selama tempoh atau lebih hendaklah, jika tiada apa-apa peruntukan yang nyata ditetapkan oleh Kanun iniberkenaan dengan seksaan bagi pakatjahat jenayah itu, diseksa sama seperti seolah-olah ia telah menyubahati kesalahan itu.
(2) Barangsiapa menjadi satu pihak dalam suatu pakatjahat jenayah yang lain daripada pakatjahat jenayah bagi melakukan kesalahan yang boleh diseksa sebagaimana yang tersebut di atas itu, hendaklah diseksa dengan penjara selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada enam bulan, atau dengan denda , atau dengan kedua-duanya.

Oleh yang demikian, menurut seksyen 120B (1) , seseorang yang menjadi anggota dalam pakatjahat jenayah bagi melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dengan hukuman bunuh, misalnya kesalahan membunuh orang di bawah seksyen 302KK dan kesalahan terhadap negara di bawah seksyen 121 KK, maka anggota pakatjahat jenayah itu boleh dihukum bunuh. Ini bermakna setiap anggota yang terlibat dengan pakatjahat tersebut boleh dihukum bunuh walaupun seorang sahaja yang benar-benar melakukan kesalahan menbunuh itu.( Seseorang yang melakukan pakatjahat jenayah bagi kesalahan-kesalahan seumpamanya itu boleh dihukum bunuh seolah-olah dia sendiri telah menyubahati kesalahan itu.

Sementara itu, menurut seksyen 120B (2) KK pula, bagi seseorang yang melakukan kesalahan pakatjahat jenayah selain kesalahan-kesalahan yang dikategorikan di seksyen 120B (1) , misalnya pakatjahat dalam melindungi orang-orang yang diupah untuk sesuatu perhimpunan yang menyalahi undang-undang di bawah seksyen 157 ( yang boleh dipenjara sehingga 6 bulan) atau pakatjahat jenayah dalam kesalahan menerima rasuah di bawah seksyen 163 ( boleh dihukum penjara 1 tahun) dan kesalahan –kesalahan lain seumpamanya, maka orang-orang yang menjadi anggota dalam pakatjahat itu boleh dihukum penjara selama tempoh yang boleh samapai 6 bulan, atau denda sahaja, atau dengan kedua-dua bentuk hukuman, iaitu penjara dan denda.

Di sini juga ingin dinyatakan perbezaan di antara pakatjahat jenayah di bawah seksyen 120A dengan subahat melalui pakatjahat jenayah di bawah seksyen 107 (b)
Seksyen 107 (b) menyatakan

“ Seseorang adalah bersubahat melakukan sesuatu perkara jika ia :

“Mengambil bahagian bersama dengan seorang atau beberapa orang lain dalam apa-apa pakatjahat bagi melakukan perkara itu, jika suatu perbuatan atau suatu ketinggalan yang menyalahi undang-undang berlaku menurut pakatjahat itu, dan dengan tujuan hendak melakukan perkara itu…”

Dalam situasi ini pensubahat akan mengambil bahagian secara bersama-sama atau lebih senang diertikan seseorang itu bersubahat dengan pihak yang melakukan pakatjahat jenayah. Elemen-elemen yang boleh dikenalpasti untuk mensabitkan seseorang itu bersubahat dengan cara pakat jahat ialah ;

(a) seseorang itu mestilah mengambil bahagian dalam pakatjahat, walaupun tidak menyertai dalam melakukan kesalahan itu ;
(b) kesalahan itu merupakan perbuatan salah atau ketinggalan salah .
(c) perbuatan atau ketinggalan salah itu telah berlaku, berlaku menurut pakatjahat itu
(d) mereka memang bertujuan untuk melakukan perkara tersebut

Di dalam kes R lwn Hawkesley [1959] Cr. L. J. 1273, di mana dua orang tertuduh A dan B telah meminta seorang pemandu teksi (C) , menghantar mereka ke suatu tempat di luar Bandar. Semasa dalam pertengahan jalan tersebut, kedua-dua tertuduh ( A dan B ) telah memberitahu C bahawa mereka bercadang untuk melakukan samun di sebuah kelab golf. Sebelum daripada ini, C sememangnya tidak mengetahui hala tujuan A dan B. Seperti yang diarahkan, C telah menurunkan kedua-dua A dan B berhampiran dengan kelab golf tersebut. Dalam masa yang sama kedua-dua A dan B telah mengarahkan C supaya dating mengambil mereka semula selepas daripada tempoh satu jam kemudian. Apabila C pulang semula ke Bandar bagi meneruskan pekerjannya memandu teksi dan tidak dating semula ke tempat itu seperti yang diarahkannya. Sebelum sempat menyamun, kedua-dua A dan B telah ditangkap dan telah dituduh kerana memiliki alat-alatuntuk tujuan melakukan kesalahan pecah rumah pada waktu malam. Sebaliknya C juga dituduh bersubahat dengan cara pakatjahat untuk melakukan jenayah pecah rumah pada waktu malam. Mahkamah memutuskan oleh kerana C tidak mengetahui pada awlnya tujuan A dan B, maka C juga tiada sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa A dan B akan melakukan suatu jenayah, mak tiada bukti bahawa C bersubahat dengan cara pakatjahat untuk melakukan jenayah tersebut.



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